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Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for 1
a Genuine Causal Role for Consciousness? 2
Paavo Pylkkänen 3
It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts 4
of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do 5
because of them, and that this is the way in which the mind acts, and not 6
from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I 7
wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which 8
the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and 9
misnaming. (Plato, The Phaedo) 10
1 Introduction 11
Does consciousness have causal powers? Does it make a difference to the 12
effects of information processing whether or not the system is conscious of 13
a given item of information? Are our actions at least sometimes determined 14
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by our conscious free will? Since Libet’s (1985) work on the neuroscience of 15
free will, the notion that the conscious will is not the original determinant 16
of action has won increasing support. For example, Velmans’s (1991) work 17
suggests that consciousness “is neither necessary for any type of mental ability 18
nor does it occur early enough to act as a cause of the acts or processes typically 19
thought to be its effects” (Van Gulick 2014, p. 36). The radical upshot of 20
this line of thinking is the claim that “the sorts of mental abilities that are 21
typically thought to require consciousness can all be realized unconsciously 22
in the absence of the supposedly required self-awareness” (ibid.). In Libet’s 23
famous studies, conscious self-awareness is present, but Van Gulick notes that 24
many claim that it occurs too late to be the cause of the relevant actions: “self- 25
awareness or meta-mental consciousness according to these arguments turns 26
out to be a psychological after-effect rather than an initiating cause, more like 27
a post facto printout” (ibid.). Van Gulick adds, however, that the arguments 28
are controversial and that many theorists regard the empirical data as no real 29
threat to the causal status of consciousness (for a recent discussion of the issue 30
from various viewpoints, see e.g. Pockett et al. 2006). 31
But how are we to understand the causal status of consciousness? In 32
philosophy of mind there has been a long debate about the problem of mental 33
causation. Many philosophers assume that consciousness is in some sense 34
a nonphysical property. But this immediately gives rise to the problem of 35
understanding how something nonphysical could possibly influence some- 36
thing physical. A key idea to be explored in this chapter is that the ontological 37
interpretation of quantum theory might throw new light upon this perennial 38
issue. This interpretation suggests that a new type of active information is 39
playing a key causal role in physical processes at the quantum level. Now, 40
when one examines the various suggestions about the putative causal powers 41
of consciousness, many of them refer to the role of information, in one way 42
or another. This then suggests a strategy for the present chapter. We will first 43
consider how the various suggestions about the causal status of consciousness 44
involve information before asking whether such information in mental and 45
conscious states could be connected to information at the quantum level. In 46
this way we could begin to understand mental causation, and the causal role of 47
conscious experiences in particular, in a new way. Of course, this is a big and 48
difficult issue and we can only sketch the solution in a single chapter. However, 49
even this sketch will hopefully illustrate the great potential of quantum 50
theory when trying to meet some of the grand challenges facing the social 51
sciences. 52
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2 Van Gulick and Revonsuo on the Causal 53
Efficacy of Consciousness 54
In his useful review of the suggestions about the causal role of consciousness 55
Van Gulick (2014, pp. 34–42) says that consciousness is thought to provide 56
the organism with (a) more flexible control; (b) better social coordination; 57
(c) more integrated representation; (d) more global informational access; (e) 58
increased freedom of will; and (f ) intrinsic motivation. In this section I will 59
briefly explicate these (as well as some of Revonsuo’s 2006 related ideas) 60
and then, in the next section, discuss how they connect with the notion of 61
information. Note that the aim in this chapter is not to evaluate critically 62
these suggestions. The aim is rather to indicate, for the sake of the discussions 63
that follows, that there is at least a reasonable possibility that consciousness 64
has a genuine causal role, and that this connects strongly with the notion of 65
information. For a more detailed discussion the reader is advised to consult 66
the references given below, as well as in Van Gulick (2014, pp. 35–42) and 67
Revonsuo (2006). Let us now consider a number of suggestions about the 68
causal role of consciousness. 69
It is common to claim that conscious mental processes provide a flexible 70
and adaptive type of control, as opposed to unconscious automatic processes 71
(Anderson 1983). Even if these latter can be quick, they are also relatively fixed 72
and predetermined, and thus not particularly effective in unexpected situations 73
(Penfield 1975). Also, when the challenge is to learn new skills, conscious 74
attention is typically assumed to be important at the early stages of learning 75
(Shiffrin and Schneider 1977). 76
It has been suggested that organisms that are conscious of their own and 77
others’ mental states have a better ability to interact, cooperate, and communi- 78
cate. The idea is that such meta-mental or “higher-order” consciousness would 79
enable a better capacity for social coordination, which in turn can be thought 80
to provide adaptive advantage (Humphreys 1982; Van Gulick 2014, p. 38). 81
It has further been suggested that conscious experiences enable a more 82
unified and integrated representation of reality, which allows for amore flexible 83
response in various situations (Campbell 1994; Van Gulick 2014, pp. 38–39; 84
Tononi and Koch 2015). 85
It is a well-known suggestion that information in conscious mental states is 86
globally available to a number of different mental subsystems or “modules”, 87
and can thus be made use of in many different ways in behavior (Baars 1988). 88
In contrast, it is argued that non-conscious information is usually available 89
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only to special mental modules and has a more limited effect upon behavior 90
and action (Fodor 1983). (However, Rosenthal 2009 thinks it is unclear that a 91
state’s potential to have global effects coincides with its being conscious.) 92
When it comes to free will, it seems that conscious experience not only 93
presents us with the options to choose from (at least sometimes), it also seems 94
to be a prerequisite for such freedom. Mustn’t one be conscious to be able 95
to make a free choice at all (Van Gulick 2014, p. 41)? One should note that 96
researchers such as Velmans have suggested that there can be unconscious free 97
will; but it is not obvious that a decisionmade unconsciously can be considered 98
truly free. 99
Finally, it has been suggested that certain conscious states, such as pleasure 100
and pain, have an intrinsic motivating force (e.g., attraction) as an indivisible 101
part of the experience itself. The idea is that such a force cannot be reduced to 102
nonconscious properties (for a brief account of the various viewpoints on this 103
issue, see Van Gulick 2014, pp. 41–2). 104
Revonsuo (2006) has considered the causal powers of consciousness (or 105
the “phenomenal level” as he calls it) in the light of various studies on 106
blindsight, implicit perception, nonconscious visually guided actions, and 107
similar phenomena. He acknowledges that there are complex information 108
processing mechanisms in the brain that in themselves are nonconscious 109
or, in his terms, “realize no phenomenal level of organization.” However, 110
he emphasizes that such nonconscious “zombie systems” seem to have only 111
limited causal powers in guiding organism–environment interaction, whereas 112
the contribution of consciousness (or the “phenomenal level”) seems to be 113
decisive for meaningful interactions with our environment. 114
He further considers disorders, such as epileptic automatisms and sleep- 115
walking, which seem to turn the whole person into a nonconscious zombie, 116
and notes that a careful examination of such zombies reveals that nonconscious 117
organism–environment interaction, while complex, is typically pointless. He 118
concludes (2006, pp. xxiii–xxiv): 119
other types of disorders show that the simulated phenomenal world in the 120
brain has unique causal powers in determining the behavioral trajectories of our 121
physical bodies. In the light of the evidence from these disorders, consciousness 122
surfaces as a causally potent biological system with unique causal powers. 123
Therefore, we need not worry about epiphenomenalism any longer. 124
We note here that Revonsuo’s reference to the way in which the simulated 125
phenomenal world in the brain determines behavioral trajectories of bodies 126
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is interestingly analogous to Bohm’s notion that active information encoded 127
in the quantum field determines the trajectories of particles at the quantum 128
level (we will discuss this latter idea below). We also note that to avoid truly 129
epiphenomenalism or reductionism, Revonsuo needs to show how conscious 130
experiences qua conscious could possibly play a genuine causal role in guiding 131
the physical organism without violating the laws of physics (or the causal 132
closure of the physical domain). This is of course connected to the problem of 133
mental causation, a solution to which we are trying to sketch in this chapter. 134
3 How the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness 135
Connects with Information 136
Let us now see how the above suggestions make a link between consciousness 137
and information. We can understand “more flexible control” as flexibility in 138
the way that information can be used to guide the organism. It seems that 139
consciousness makes possible such flexibility. Unconscious information just 140
“acts” when it is activated, according to an automatic routine. If there are 141
items of unconscious information that imply mutually exclusive actions, then 142
presumably the “stronger” information wins, and this may take place without 143
conscious experience (“stronger” here may be assumed to correspond to e.g. a 144
higher level of neural activity). However, it seems possible that when a person 145
is conscious of an item of information, at least some (automatic) activity of 146
that information can be suspended. Also, it seems obvious that at least in 147
some situations a person can review a number of different options, and choose 148
the one that seems best in the given situation. (In this way consciousness, 149
flexible control, and free will seem related.) Of course, which option is in 150
the end chosen may not be the result of a completely “free” choice, but is 151
instead determined by some further information which arises when reviewing 152
the options, with a content like “it is reasonable to do X” (cf. Bohm 1990). 153
We also noted that it has been suggested that organisms that are conscious of 154
their own and others’ mental states have a better ability to interact, cooperate, 155
and communicate. “Conscious of” can here be understood to include “having 156
meta-level information about.” This connects with higher order theories of 157
consciousness which assume that what makes a given mental state conscious 158
is that there exists a higher level of (typically) unconscious mental state, which 159
has the content that one is in the first-order mental state or activity (Rosenthal 160
1997). Thus, consciousness is not assumed to be a neural or computational 161
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property, but rather something that arises when initially nonconscious mental 162
states are related in a suitable way. It seems quite natural to think about 163
such meta-mentality in terms of information. We could say that meta- 164
mentality involves higher-order “information about information” rather than 165
just first-order “information about the environment.” In these terms, higher- 166
order theories of consciousness suggest that consciousness essentially involves 167
information about information. A simple possibility would be to postulate that 168
what makes a given informational state conscious is that there exists a higher 169
level of (typically) unconscious information, which has the content that one 170
is in the first-order informational state. When it comes to the causal efficacy 171
of consciousness, the question is whether having meta-level information (and 172
consciousness) in this sense implies a better ability to interact, cooperate, and 173
communicate. Below I will briefly note how in the Bohmian scheme active 174
information at a given level can organize the behavior of elements at a lower 175
level. The challenge here, too, is to find out whether being conscious of active 176
information gives the organism some special advantages when it comes to 177
interaction, cooperation, and communication. 178
We further mentioned the suggestion that conscious experiences enable a 179
more unified and integrated representation of reality, which allows for a more 180
flexible response in various situations. To understand this feature better, we 181
can usefully quote van Gulick (2014, pp. 38–9): 182
Conscious experience presents us with a world of objects independently existing 183
in space and time. Those objects are typically present to us in a multi-modal fash- 184
ion that involves the integration of information from various sensory channels as 185
well as from background knowledge andmemory. Conscious experience presents 186
us not with isolated properties or features but with objects and events situated in 187
an ongoing independent world, and it does so by embodying in its experiential 188
organization and dynamics the dense network of relations and interconnections 189
that collectively constitute the meaningful structure of a world of objects. 190
This reminds us about the fact that the information we meet in conscious- 191
ness is highly integrated and structured and also meaningful in various ways. 192
Van Gulick acknowledges that non-experiental sensory information can also 193
have an adaptive effect on behavior (e.g., as seen in reflexes). However, he 194
draws attention to the work of Lorenz (1977) and Gallistel (1990), which 195
suggest that conscious experience provides a more integrated representation 196
of reality, which in turn enables more flexible responses. If we consider this 197
feature in informational terms, it seems that a certain kind of information only 198
becomes available and, especially, flexibly usable to the organism in conscious 199
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experience. This connects with the previously mentioned issues of flexible 200
control and free will, in the sense that consciousness, flexible control, free will, 201
and unified and integrated representations are all interconnected. Unified and 202
integrated representations, especially when consciously experienced, provide 203
the “free will” rich information about the available options which enables 204
flexibility in the control of the organism. 205
There are a number of other researchers who emphasize that consciousness 206
involves an integrated representation in the form of a “virtual reality” or 207
“world-simulation.” Revonsuo, for example, characterizes conscious expe- 208
rience in dreams as a complex, organized, temporally progressing world- 209
simulation. During waking we also experience subjectively an internal, phe- 210
nomenal, simulated world, which we take to be the “real” world, when 211
consciousness happens to be online with the external physical world (Revonsuo 212
2015, p. 65). 213
And as we have already seen, for Revonsuo the simulated phenomenal 214
world in the brain is causally efficacious in that it determines the behavioral 215
trajectories of our physical bodies. Here we can ask what the nature of a world- 216
simulation is. It seems natural to think of it as some kind of structure of 217
information that is meaningful and has phenomenal properties. And given 218
that this world-simulation guides the organism, it is natural to think of it as a 219
kind of active information in the Bohmian sense that will be explained later. 220
Let us then move on to consider the suggestion that information in 221
conscious mental states is globally available to a number of different mental 222
subsystems or “modules” and can thus be made use of in many different ways 223
in behavior. This feature, together with the issues discussed previously, helps to 224
explain the flexible control that consciousness seems to enable. We saw above 225
that information in conscious experience is typically very rich in its content—it 226
is unified and integrated. If consciousness further means that such information 227
becomes globally available to many different subsystems, it clearly becomes 228
easier to understand why consciousness enables more flexible control. To put 229
it briefly, the idea is that consciousness both enables the sort of information 230
that flexible control requires, and it also makes it possible for such information 231
to reach the subsystems that are required in the execution of the control. 232
In recent years much attention has been given to Tononi’s integrated 233
information theory of consciousness (Tononi and Koch 2015; Oizumi et al. 234
2014). There are various reasons why Tononi thinks the concept of infor- 235
mation is needed in a theory of consciousness. To account for the fact that 236
consciousness is differentiated (i.e., that each experience has a specific set 237
of phenomenological distinctions), a system of mechanisms must specify a 238
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differentiated conceptual structure via a process of in-forming (we will see 239
later that Bohm’s notion of active information likewise refers to a process 240
of in-forming, though in a somewhat different sense). Tononi further says 241
that to account for the irreducible unity of consciousness (i.e., that each 242
experience is irreducible to non-interdependent components), there has to be 243
integrated information, in the sense that the conceptual structure specified by 244
the system is irreducible to that specified by non-interdependent subsystems. 245
More technically, the presence of integration (characterized by big phi or ˆ) 246
means that a partitioning of a system of mechanisms would destroy several 247
cause–effect repertoires and change others. 248
Tononi’s theory tries to explain what consciousness is in terms of the 249
notion of information. But the theory also suggests that consciousness as 250
integrated information makes a difference to the behavior of the organism. 251
Tononi and Koch (2015, p. 11) write: “a brain having a high capacity for 252
information integration will better match an environment with a complex 253
causal structure varying across multiple time scales, than a network made 254
of many modules that are informationally encapsulated.” And given the 255
hypothesis that consciousness is integrated information, this implies that it 256
enables a better match with the environment and consequently more adaptive 257
behavior. 258
Wehave already briefly considered the relation of free will and consciousness 259
above, and will return to this issue below. Van Gulick’s review also drew 260
attention to the suggestion that certain conscious states, such as pleasure and 261
pain, have an intrinsic motivating force (e.g., attraction) as an indivisible part 262
of the experience itself. The idea is that such force cannot be reduced to 263
nonconscious properties. This suggests that consciousness not only enables 264
information to be integrated and globally available, but that it also involves 265
(perhaps gives rise to) “forces,” such as attraction. Again, we will return below 266
to consider this interesting suggestion when discussing the notion of active 267
information. 268
Van Gulick’s review (as well as Revonsuo’s and Tononi’s theories) make 269
a reasonably strong case for the idea that consciousness has genuine causal 270
powers. Now, presumably each particular argument for such causal efficacy 271
is subject to potentially serious criticisms, but I think that it is fair to say 272
that together they imply that the question is at least an open one. It at least 273
seems to make a difference to the behavior of an organism whether or not it 274
is conscious. I have also drawn attention to the way many of the suggestions 275
about the causal efficacy of consciousness involve a link between consciousness 276
and information. In the rest of the chapter I will try to understand this link 277
better by discussing it in the context of a new notion of active information that 278
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is extended all the way into physics. However, before doing that I want to meet 279
briefly another challenge. For as was already hinted at above, contemporary 280
philosophers of mind often suggest that consciousness cannot have genuinely 281
causal powers if we stay within the physicalist scientific world picture.We need 282
to address this issue briefly before proceeding. 283
4 Philosophy of Mind: Does Consciousness 284
Have No Causal Power? 285
Much of contemporary Anglo-American analytical philosophy is committed 286
to physicalism, which means that philosophers assume that everything is 287
physical, or everything is in an appropriate way dependent (or “supervenient”) 288
upon the physical. However, many philosophers find it difficult to simply 289
reduce the mental to the physical, and they thus defend a doctrine known 290
as “nonreductive physicalism.” This typically holds that mental properties are 291
nonphysical properties that, however, depend or supervene upon the physical. 292
Note that “mental” here is not taken to be synonymous with “conscious,” but 293
includes even such possibly nonconscious properties as intentionality (in the 294
sense of the “directedness” or “aboutness” of mental states). 295
The trouble with nonreductive physicalism is that it seems to leave the men- 296
tal as causally inefficacious or epiphenomenal. If the mental is nonphysical, it 297
seems impossible to understand how it could be the cause of physical effects. 298
Even the notion of mental-physical dependence or supervenience doesn’t 299
seem to help here. Some philosophers (e.g., Stephen Yablo, David Lewis, 300
and Jaegwon Kim) have developed some ingenious ways to make the idea of 301
genuine mental causation plausible (see Ritchie 2008). However, it seems that 302
even these fail to tell us how mental properties (conceived as nonphysical) 303
could possibly influence the physical course of events. There thus seems to 304
be no genuine causal role for mental properties in contemporary nonreductive 305
physicalism. This is a very unsatisfactory situation. However, to go back to, say, 306
interactive substance dualism seems equally unsatisfactory. Nagel (2005) has 307
succinctly summarized the situation: “neither dualism nor materialism seems 308
likely to be true, but it is not clear what the alternatives are.” 309
Note that this apparent epiphenomenalism of the mental is particularly 310
troublesome for our above discussion about the causal role of conscious 311
experience. It is not at all obvious that conscious experiences are physical or 312
material in any traditional sense (remember e.g. Chalmers’s 1996 discussion 313
of the “hard problem” of consciousness). Thus contemporary nonreductive 314
physicalism seems forced to declare consciousness to be an epiphenomenon. 315
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Reductive physicalism resolves the issue trivially by assuming that conscious 316
experiences are physical states. But for those who do not understand how 317
conscious experience could possibly be a physical state, this “resolution” is not 318
of much value. 319
We have noted that nonreductive physicalism implies that consciousness 320
is epiphenomenal, but how seriously should we take the nonreductive phys- 321
icalists’ arguments? For if one examines the views of many of the leading 322
physicalists (whether reductive or nonreductive), one is struck by the fact that 323
hardly any attention is given to what seems to be the most fundamental of the 324
natural sciences, namely (fundamental) physics. This seems to be in violation 325
of the very principles the physicalists have usually set themselves, namely that 326
they ought to base their metaphysics upon the best theories in the natural 327
sciences. A particularly sharp criticism of such tendencies in philosophy has 328
recently been made by Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. vii). They write, for 329
example, that “standard analytic metaphysics (or ‘neo-scholastic’ metaphysics 330
as we call it) contributes nothing to human knowledge and, where it has any 331
impact at all, systematically misrepresents the relative significance of what 332
we do know on the basis of science.” Such “neo-scholastic” metaphysics also 333
includes analytic philosophy of mind, in so for as this gives little attention to 334
the results of modern science, including fundamental physics. Ladyman and 335
Ross’s view is extreme, but I think they are correct in drawing attention to 336
certain weak points in contemporary philosophy of mind. If we want to claim 337
that the physical world leaves no room for the causal powers of consciousness, 338
we should justify our view on the basis of the best theories in physics. And as we 339
will see in the next section, it is not clear that, say, quantum theory excludes 340
in principle the causal powers of consciousness. On the contrary, a natural 341
extension of quantum theory might well make room for mental properties 342
and even conscious experience in our scientific world picture. 343
5 Information in the Ontological 344
Interpretation of Quantum Theory 345
Can quantum theory throw any new light upon the nature of information, 346
whichmight also help us to understand the relationship between consciousness 347
and information, and the causal powers of consciousness? I suggest that the 348
best place to start exploring this issue is David Bohm’s interpretation of 349
quantum theory, in its later form developed in cooperation with Basil Hiley 350
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(Bohm and Hiley 1987, 1993; see also Pylkkänen et al. 2016; for Bohm’s early 351
work on quantum theory and the mind, see Pylkkänen 2014). 352
To understand the significance of Bohm’s work for the mind–matter 353
problem it is necessary to understand the development of physics in the 354
twentieth century.When quantum theory was emerging, physicists were trying 355
to make sense of puzzling features such as wave–particle duality and, a little 356
later, entanglement. In particular they were attempting to develop ontological 357
models of quantum systems such as electrons. In the 1920s Louis de Broglie 358
came up with the idea of an electron being a particle guided by a pilot 359
wave, while Schrödinger was trying to describe the electron as some kind 360
of a physical field. These models had some difficulties, though in retrospect 361
we can see that at least de Broglie’s ideas could have been developed further 362
(Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009). What happened however was that the 363
so-called “Copenhagen interpretation” won the day in the 1920s. There are 364
actually many different versions of this interpretation, but it is typical of them 365
that they emphasize epistemology—in the sense of our ability to predict the 366
statistical results of measurement—rather than ontology—in the sense of a 367
model of what quantum reality may be like, including when we are not making 368
measurements. As a result, physicists were not able to offer a new notion of 369
objective physical reality, which philosophers could then use when discussing 370
ontological issues, such as the mind–matter relationship. 371
It is here that Bohm comes in. In the early 1950s, after discussions with 372
Einstein in Princeton, he independently rediscovered de Broglie’s theory and 373
formulated it in a more coherent way, providing a first consistent realistic 374
model of quantum systems (Bohm 1952). Bohm’s interpretation was initially 375
resisted, but is today more and more widely acknowledged as one of the 376
key possible interpretations of quantum theory. Later on further ontological 377
models were proposed, for example Everett’s (1957) “many worlds” interpre- 378
tation and Ghirardi et al.’s (1986) objective collapse theory, and currently 379
the nature of quantum reality is intensively debated within the philosophy 380
of physics community (see e.g. the anthology The Wave Function: Essays on 381
the Metaphysics of QuantumMechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Albert 382
(2013)). We do not know which ontological interpretation (if any) is correct, 383
but each may reveal something significant about the nature of physical reality 384
at a very fundamental level. One should note that there are by now also 385
different versions of the Bohm theory. Much attention has in recent years 386
been given to a minimalist version known as “Bohmian mechanics” (see e.g. 387
Goldstein 2013; for a balanced discussion of the relation between de Broglie’s 388
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and Bohm’s approaches, see Holland (2011)). Bohm himself developed from 389
the mid-1970s, with Basil Hiley, a philosophically more radical version they 390
called the “ontological interpretation,” culminating in their 1993 book The 391
Undivided Universe. 392
How, then, might Bohm’s theory be relevant to the mind–matter rela- 393
tionship and to the causal status of consciousness in particular? The theory 394
postulates that an electron is a particle, always accompanied by a new type of 395
field, which guides its behavior—thus the name “pilot wave theory” which 396
is sometimes used. Jack Sarfatti has characterized the Bohmian electron 397
imaginatively by saying that it consists of a “thought-like” pilot wave, guiding a 398
“rock-like” particle. This metaphor suggests that matter at the quantum level is 399
fundamentally different from the sort of mechanical matter of classical physics 400
that is presupposed in philosophy of mind by typical materialists. If even the 401
basic elements that constitute us have “thought-like” and “rock-like” aspects, 402
then it is perhaps not so surprising that a very complex aggregate of such 403
elements (such as a human being) has a body, accompanied by a mind that 404
guides it. 405
But, one might think, this is merely a vague metaphor. Now, Bohm himself 406
realized in the early 1980s that the pilot wave might be more literally “thought- 407
like” in a very interesting sense. He considered the mathematical expression of 408
the so-called quantum potential, which describes the way the pilot wave affects 409
the particle. He realized that the quantum potential, and thus the effect of the 410
wave upon the particle, only depends on the form or shape of the wave, not 411
on the size or amplitude of the wave (mathematically, the quantum potential 412
depends only on the second spatial derivative of the amplitude of the wave). 413
He went on to suggest that the quantum wave is literally putting form into, or 414
in-forming, the motion of the particle along its trajectory, rather than pushing 415
and pulling it mechanically. 416
Note that we are here talking about information for the electron, not 417
information for us—we are thus thinking about information as an objective 418
commodity that exists out there in the world, independently of us, guiding 419
and organizing physical processes. The form of the quantum wave reflects the 420
form of the environment of the particle—for example the presence of slits in 421
the famous two-slit experiment. In this experiment, electrons arrive one by one 422
at the detecting screen at localized points, suggesting that they are particles. Yet 423
as we keep on watching, the individual spots build up an interference pattern, 424
suggesting that each individual electron also has wave properties. Remember 425
that in the Bohm theory the electron is seen as a particle and a wave. In the 426
two-slit experiment the particle goes through one of the slits. The wave goes 427
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through both slits, interferes and guides or in-forms the particle in such a way 428
that an interference pattern is formed as many electrons pass through the slit 429
system. It thus seems that with the help of the notion of active information 430
we can have a realist interpretation of the quantum theory, without the usual 431
puzzles, such as Schrödinger’s cats, many worlds, or the consciousness of the 432
observer producing physical reality (for details see Bohm and Hiley 1987, 433
1993). 434
What happens with the electron is somewhat analogous to a ship on 435
autopilot, guided by radar waves that carry information about the environment 436
of the ship. The radar waves are not pushing and pulling the ship, but rather 437
in-forming the much greater energy of the ship. Bohm generalized this into 438
a notion of “active information”—which applies in situations where a form 439
with smaller energy enters and informs a larger energy. We see this not only 440
with various artificial devices, but also in the way the form of the DNA 441
molecule informs biological processes, and even in the way forms act in human 442
subjective experience (for example, seeing the form of a shadow in a dark night 443
and interpreting it as “danger” may give rise to a powerful psychosomatic 444
reaction). Indeed, Bohm (1990) sketched out how the active information 445
approach could be developed into a theory of mind and matter. 446
While the radar-wave analogy helps us to understand the Bohmian electron, 447
it is important to realize that the quantum potential has some radically holistic 448
properties that go beyond what is implied by such mechanical analogies. 449
In particular, in the many-body system there can be a nonlocal connection 450
between particles that depends on the quantum state of the whole, in a way 451
that cannot be expressed in terms of the relationships of the particles alone. 452
Bearing in mind that this quantum state involves active information, we can 453
note an interesting connection to Tononi’s idea of integrated information. It 454
is likely that the many-body quantum state involves the most radically holistic 455
(integrated) information that science has thus far detected, thus making it 456
interesting to consider its role when trying to understand consciousness as 457
integrated information. 458
6 Bohm’s Sketch for a Theory of the Relation 459
of Mind and Matter 460
Bohm proposed that we understand mental states as involving a hierarchy of 461
levels of active information. We typically not merely think about objects in the 462
external world, but we can also become aware of our thinking. He suggested 463
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that suchmeta-level awareness typically involves a higher level of thought. This 464
higher level gathers information about the lower level. But because its essential 465
nature is active information, it not merely makes a passive representation of 466
the lower level. Rather, the higher level also acts to organize the lower level, 467
somewhat analogously to the way the active information in the pilot wave acts 468
to organize the movement of the particle. (In particular, the higher level of 469
thought can organize the content in the lower level into a coherent whole. This 470
could be seen as a kind of “integrated information” and suggests yet another 471
connection with Tononi’s integrated information theory of consciousness.) 472
And of course, we can become aware of this higher level of thought from a yet 473
higher level, and so on. 474
How then does mind, understood as a hierarchy of levels of active informa- 475
tion, connect with matter in the Bohmian scheme? First of all, he suggested 476
that it is natural to extend the quantum ontology. So just as there is a pilot 477
wave that guides the particle, there can be a super-pilot wave that guides 478
the first-order pilot wave, and so on. (He claimed that such an extension is 479
“natural” from the mathematical point of view.) Now it seems that we have 480
two hierarchies, one for mind and another for matter. His next step was to 481
postulate that these are the same hierarchy, so that there is only one hierarchy. 482
This then allows, at least in principle, for a new way of understanding how 483
mind can affect the body. Information at a given level of active information 484
in the mind can act downwards, all the way to the active information in the 485
pilot waves of particles in, say, the synapses or neural microtubules, and this 486
influence can then be amplified to signals in the motor cortex, leading to a 487
physical movement of the body. 488
Bohm’s proposal differs strongly from the usual theories in cognitive neu- 489
roscience. Most neuroscientists ignore quantum considerations and seek the 490
“neural correlates of consciousness” in some macroscopic neural phenomena, 491
which can presumably be understood in terms of classical physics. Yet Bohm is 492
proposing that mind, understood as a hierarchy of levels of active information, 493
is implemented in (or perhaps even identical with) a hierarchy of super- 494
quantum fields. However, these fields are not separate from the macroscopic 495
neural processes. On the contrary, the role of the fields is in the end to gather 496
information about the manifest neural processes and, on the basis of what this 497
information means, to organize and guide them. 498
One should acknowledge that it is a tremendous challenge to work out an 499
empirically testable theory along the Bohmian lines. The ideas described above 500
provide a scheme for such an endeavor, rather than a fully developed theory. 501
Bohm and Pylkkänen (1992) were discussing ways to develop the scheme in 502
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a later development, Hiley and Pylkkänen 503
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(2005) discussed the prospects of applying the Bohm scheme to Beck and 504
Eccles’s quantum model of synaptic exocytosis (for a review of Beck and 505
Eccles’s model, as well as other quantum approaches to consciousness, see 506
Atmanspacher 2011).While this may be a small step forward, problems remain. 507
For example, Henry Stapp (2005) has pointed out that the sort of interference 508
of the mind upon the laws of quantum mechanics that the Bohmian scheme 509
involves can lead to serious problems with special relativity. This is a challenge 510
that future research along Bohmian lines needs to face. A possible way for 511
meeting this challenge is opened up by a recent study on the nature of nonlocal 512
quantum information transfer by Walleczek and Grössing (2016). 513
While the possibility of non-negligible quantum effects in the brain is often 514
dismissed as implausible, there are interesting recent advances in quantum 515
biology. And it is already part of mainstream neuroscience that the retina acts 516
to amplify the effects of individual photons. Also, researchers such as Roger 517
Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have discussed in great detail how quantum 518
effects might play a role in neural processes via quantum coherence and 519
collapse in neural microtubules. Connecting the Hameroff–Penrose work 520
with the Bohm scheme is one potentially fruitful line for future research. 521
Indeed I have begun to explore these connections together with Hameroff 522
and the philosopher Rocco Gennaro, who is a specialist on higher-order 523
(HO) theories of consciousness (which seem to fit together with Bohm’s 524
idea of the mind as a hierarchy of levels of information). (For an early result 525
of this cooperation, focusing on combining HO theories with Penrose and 526
Hameroff’s orchestrated objective reduction (ORCH-OR) hypothesis, leading 527
to “deeper order thought” (DOT), see Hameroff et al. 2014.) 528
Note that Bohm introduced a new category, namely information, to the 529
debate. Is information physical or mental? He suggested that it is simultane- 530
ously both physical andmental, or has these two as its aspects. This sort of view 531
is called a double-aspect theory in philosophy of mind. The traditional worry 532
with double-aspect views is that the underlying thing, which has the aspects, 533
is left as a mystery. The hypothesis that information is the fundamental, 534
underlying feature of reality can be seen as a way to alleviate this worry. 535
7 Understanding Consciousness in the Active 536
Information Scheme 537
A common criticism of contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind— 538
such as identity theory and functionalism—is that they leave out conscious 539
experience, instead of explaining it (Searle 1992). How might conscious 540
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experience fit into the active information scheme? In particular, is it possible 541
to understand the causal status of consciousness in this scheme? While Bohm 542
saw nature as a dynamic process where information and meaning play a key 543
dynamic role, he assumed that “99.99 per cent” of our meanings are not 544
conscious (Bohm in discussion with Renée Weber 1987, p. 439). Thus, for 545
example, he thought it obvious that the particles of physics are not conscious. 546
But how can one then address the problem of consciousness in this scheme? 547
In other words, why is there sometimes conscious experience associated with 548
the activity of information (as seems obvious at least with humans and higher 549
animals)? Why doesn’t all the activity of information in humans proceed “in 550
the dark,” as it seems to do in physical and biological processes in general? And 551
does the presence of consciousness make a causal difference? Bohm himself did 552
not say much about the hard problem of consciousness (he died a little before 553
the hard problem was made the center of attention by David Chalmers in the 554
1994 Tucson consciousness conference). However, I have suggested that the 555
most natural context to explore this issue is some version of an HO theory of 556
consciousness (Pylkkänen 2007, p. 247). Let us here expand somewhat on this 557
idea. 558
As we saw above, the basic idea of higher-order theories of consciousness, 559
when expressed in terms of the notion of information, is to postulate that 560
what makes a given mental state (or level of information or mental activity) 561
conscious is that there exists a higher level of (typically) unconscious infor- 562
mation, which has the content that one is in the first-order mental state or 563
activity. 564
Note also that David Chalmers famously suggested that we tackle the hard 565
problem of consciousness with a double-aspect theory of information. The 566
idea is that information is a fundamental feature of the world, which always 567
has both a phenomenal and a physical aspect. Now, we could take this idea to 568
the Bohm scheme and postulate that active information, too, has phenomenal 569
properties. This then raises the question about what we should think about 570
the active information in the pilot wave of an electron. Does it, too, have 571
phenomenal properties in some sense? Bohmwent as far as to say that electrons 572
have a “primitive mind-like quality,” but by “mind” he was here referring to 573
the “activity of form,” rather than conscious phenomenal experience in any 574
full sense. 575
I think that it is reasonable to combine Chalmers’s hypothesis to active 576
information, but we need to restrict the hypothesis. For example, we could 577
say that a certain kind of active information (e.g., a holistic active information 578
that is analogous to quantum active information) has the potentiality for 579
phenomenal properties, but a potentiality that is actualized only in suitable 580
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circumstances (e.g., when a given level of active information is the intentional 581
target of a higher level of active information; or if we want to follow an 582
approach similar to that of Tononi, we could say that suitably integrated active 583
information is conscious). Of course, this also opens up the possibility for 584
genuine artificial consciousness. If we could implement quantum-like holistic 585
active information in an artificial system and set up a suitable higher-order 586
relationship of levels in the system, phenomenal properties should actualize 587
themselves, according to this hypothesis. (Or, in a Tononian approach, if 588
active information is suitably integrated in an artificial context, it would be 589
conscious.) 590
We should acknowledge that Bohm andHiley’s proposal about active infor- 591
mation at the quantum level is radical and somewhat controversial, for they are 592
in effect suggesting that this type of information ought to be acknowledged as 593
a fundamental—perhaps the fundamental—category of physics. Indeed, they 594
wrote in 1984: “the notion of a particle responding actively to information in 595
the [quantum] field is : : : far more subtle and dynamic than any others that 596
have hitherto been supposed to be fundamental in physics.” This proposal is 597
still mostly ignored within the physics community. There are some technical 598
issues with the proposal, but in my view a major reason for its being ignored 599
is that it goes so much against the prevalent mechanistic way of thinking 600
in physics. However, some leading thinkers do take it seriously, for example 601
Smith (2003). Also, an interesting adaptation of the active information scheme 602
to neuroscience has been proposed by Filk (2012). In the field of the social 603
sciences, Khrennikov (2004) has made imaginative use of the proposal and 604
the Bohm theory has also been applied to financial processes by Choustova 605
(2007) and Haven (2005). Of course, the notion of “quantum information” 606
has been widely discussed in recent years (see e.g. Bouwmeester et al. 2000). 607
The advantages of the concept of active information over quantum informa- 608
tion, when discussing some quantum experiments, have been argued for by 609
Maroney (2002); see also Maroney and Hiley (1999). 610
To summarize: Bohm’s suggestion was that a natural extension of his 611
ontological interpretation of the quantum theory can include mental processes 612
and even conscious experience into a single coherent view. From the point 613
of view of the question about the causal powers of consciousness this view 614
is particularly promising, for it makes it—at least in principle—possible to 615
understand how conscious experience, via its effects upon information, could 616
make a difference to physical processes. If we can provide an intelligible theory 617
about how conscious experience can make a difference to information, this 618
scheme provides a view of how such informational differences can then affect 619
manifest physical processes (see also Hiley and Pylkkänen 2005). We have 620
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hinted that this question can be approached within some of the already existing 621
available theories of consciousness—for example, higher order theories or 622
Tononi’s integrated information theory. 623
8 Active Information and the Causal Powers 624
of Consciousness 625
The view described above sketches out how information content might affect 626
manifest physical processes (e.g., bodily behavior) in a way that is coherent 627
with the principles of physics. We have already touched on the question of 628
the causal role of consciousness in the active information scheme. Let us now 629
consider this role in more detail. First of all, how can we understand the 630
idea that consciousness enables more flexible control in the context of the 631
active information view? More flexible control means, for example, that the 632
organism is able to choose from among different options the one that best fits 633
the situation, instead of having to follow mechanically one of the options. 634
In Bohmian terms this means that consciousness enables the organism to 635
suspend the activity of information. The way this works is that one is aware of 636
information that means something like “It is reasonable to consider different 637
options before acting.” And when one finally acts, this is based on information 638
that means “It is reasonable to do X.” In other words, flexible control in the 639
Bohmian view seems to involve higher-order, meta-level information that we 640
are conscious of (while typically, according to higher order theories, we need 641
not be conscious of the higher-order thought itself ). 642
When it comes to better social coordination, Bohm’s view involves a 643
notion he calls “common pools of information” (Bohm 1990). This notion 644
applies strikingly well at the quantum level (e.g., in the Bohmian view of 645
superconductivity) where the behavior of a system of particles can in some 646
situations be organized by information in the so called many-body wave 647
function. The particles act together in an organized way (e.g., electrons may 648
pass obstacles in a wire, which results in very low resistance). Information at the 649
level of human cognition operates presumably according to different principles 650
from information at the quantum level. However, when a group of people 651
communicate with each other (e.g., in a group discussion) they begin to build 652
up a common pool of information. This enables the group to develop common 653
intentions and carry out common actions (see e.g. Tuomela 2013). Suppose, 654
for example, that a group of eight people need to carry a very heavy grand piano 655
upstairs along a narrow staircase. They need to exchange information and 656
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make sure that they each understand what they are supposed to do. Again, it 657
is hard to imagine that such joint tasks requiring collective coordination could 658
take place without some consciousness of the shared information. However, 659
it is an experimental question to ask to what extent such collective action is 660
possible without conscious awareness. Going back to our above example, it 661
does seem difficult to act without conscious awareness at least in a situation 662
where the group needs to carry the piano through a very narrow opening. 663
While the mainstream literature in the field of collective or shared inten- 664
tionality does not consider quantum principles, there is at the very least an 665
interesting analogy between Bohm’s notion of common pools of information 666
at the quantum level and the notion of collective intentionality in social 667
ontology. Some researchers have even explored whether social phenomena 668
might involve quantum principles more literally. See, for example, Alexander 669
Wendt’s (2015) recent ground-breaking study, as well as Flender et al.’s (2009) 670
radical approach to the shared intentionality of the mother-infant relationship, 671
making use of quantum principles in a phenomenological context. 672
We have also considered the suggestion that consciousness enables more 673
unified and integrated representation. The tricky question here is whether the 674
information first gets unified and integrated in preconscious processes, and is 675
then presented to consciousness; or whether consciousness plays a role in the 676
very unification and integration of the information (Van Gulick seems to favor 677
the latter alternative). I am inclined to think that much of the unification and 678
integration takes place (largely) without consciousness, but that consciousness 679
is needed for such information to be flexibly usable in the control of behavior 680
(of course, in the Tononian approach one would say that sufficiently integrated 681
information constitutes consciousness). In the Bohmian picture it is assumed 682
that typically such information tends to act, even if it is not consciously 683
attended to. Conscious attention may then make the response of information 684
stronger, or lead to the suspension of action and reflection of the different 685
options. 686
The idea that consciousness involves more global access can also be naturally 687
understood in terms of the notion of active information. If information is 688
consciously attended to, this may start what Bohm (2003) calls a “signa- 689
somatic” flow: the significance of the information acts somatically toward a 690
more manifest level in the brain. Global access means that the significance can 691
affect many different modules. 692
When it comes to free will, Bohm used to emphasize that true freedom is 693
typically limited by our lack of knowledge—both about the consequences of 694
one’s actions and about our true motives. He refers to Schopenhauer when 695
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
312 P. Pylkkänen
he writes: “though we may perhaps be free to choose as we will, we are not 696
free to will the content of the will : : : Is there any meaning to freedom of will 697
when the content of this will is : : : determined by false knowledge of what is 698
possible” (Bohm 1986). In a more positive vein, he writes: 699
How, then, is it possible for there to be the self-awareness that is required for 700
true freedom? : : : I propose that self-awareness requires that consciousness sink 701
into its implicate (and now mainly unconscious) order. It may then be possible 702
to be directly aware, in the present, of the actual activity of past knowledge, and 703
especially of that knowledge which is : : : false : : : Then the mind may be free 704
of its bondage to the active confusion that is enfolded in its past. (Ibid.) 705
By “the implicate order” Bohm above refers (roughly) to the more subtle 706
levels of active information which include long-term memory and from which 707
the part of the content of conscious experience unfolds. It is clear that for 708
Bohm free will requires consciousness. However, it is not enough that we are 709
conscious of the options that we typically face in a situation when we are about 710
to make a choice. We also need to be aware of—and thus free from—falsity in 711
the past knowledge that we typically unconsciously hold and on the basis of 712
which we tend to react and make our choices. 713
Let us finally consider intrinsic motivation in the light of the Bohmian view. 714
What is interesting here is that Bohm emphasizes that information is typically 715
active (while passive information is a special case). One possibility is that the 716
presence of consciousness increases the level of activity of the information. 717
Thus, for example, consciousness of information with an attractive content 718
may be needed to awaken desire or make that desire more intense. At the 719
same time conscious awareness of the negative consequences of carrying out a 720
particular desire may lead to the suspension of action. In Bohmian terms, all 721
these phases involve active information. For example, desire informs us to carry 722
out a certain action X, while information about the consequences of the action 723
may result in information with the content “It is not reasonable to do X.” 724
9 Concluding Discussion 725
I have drawn on fundamental physics to support the idea that conscious 726
experiences can, at least in principle, be causally efficacious in a physical world, 727
contrary to what much of contemporary physicalism suggests. Yet we have 728
admittedly only scratched the surface of this difficult topic. Basically, I have 729
assumed that consciousness (understood as something that arises due to higher 730
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order information and/or information integration) can influence lower-level 731
information, and information in turn can influence physical processes “signa- 732
somatically,” as Bohm would put it. 733
The Bohmian view we considered suggests that nature can be under- 734
stood as a two-way movement between the aspects of soma (the physical) 735
and significance (information, meaning, the mental). Consciousness comes 736
in here, but only at the higher, subtler levels, where, say, suitable higher- 737
order relations (and/or a sufficient degree of information integration) prevail, 738
depending upon which theory of consciousness we are relying upon. Thus the 739
active information view is consistent with the idea—also supported by recent 740
experimental work—that much of our most sophisticated brain functions 741
work totally independently of consciousness. Yet the active information view 742
also makes room for the genuine causal powers of consciousness, and in this 743
way can accommodate such causal efficacy of consciousness as is suggested 744
by Van Gulick, Revonsuo, and others. Bohm himself did not address very 745
explicitly the causal powers of consciousness, but I think it is reasonable to 746
assume that his scheme makes such powers in principle possible. To explain 747
that scheme fully is, however, not possible here, and the interested reader is 748
referred to a more detailed study (Pylkkänen 2007). 749
One important potential criticism of the active information approach 750
has to do with the notion of information that is presupposed. Is it really 751
justified to use the term “information” to describe the sorts of processes 752
connected to the quantum field? One could examine this question in the 753
light of the recent developments in the philosophy of information (e.g., 754
Floridi 2015). Floridi distinguishes between environmental and semantic 755
information; and semantic information can be further distinguished into 756
factual and instructional information. The quantum active information is 757
about something (the environment, slits, etc.), it is for the particle and it helps 758
to bring about something (a certain movement of the particle). This suggests 759
that it is semantic and has both factual and instructional aspects, though this 760
issue needs to be explored more carefully in future research. Also, Maleeh 761
and Amani (2012) have usefully considered active information in relation 762
to Roederer’s (2005) notion of pragmatic information, suggesting that only 763
biological systems are capable of “genuine” information processing. I think 764
one can argue that Bohmian quantum information potential involves genuine 765
information processing (indeed, the most fundamental kind of genuine infor- 766
mation processing science has thus far discovered), but this will also need to 767
be explored in future research. 768
I would like to end by reflecting upon the quote from Plato’s Phaedo 769
(1892) provided at the start of the chapter. Plato there thinks it obvious that 770
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our physical actions depend upon “the choice of the best,” while a typical 771
materialist would say that insofar as physical actions are determined, they are 772
determined by the physical state in a previous moment (including “bones 773
and muscles”). Now, I think that the active information view allows for a 774
naturalistic grounding of Plato’s view. In their 1984 article Bohm and Hiley 775
note that there are good reasons for expecting that quantum theory, and 776
therefore the notion of a quantum information potential, would be relevant 777
when we are studying consciousness itself, as based on the material structure 778
of the brain and nervous system: 779
it may well be that in our mental processes, the quantum information potential 780
is significant (as is, for example, suggested by the fact that information regarded 781
as correct is active in determining our behaviour, while as soon as it is regarded 782
as incorrect, it ceases to be active). The quantum theory may then play a key part 783
in understanding this domain. (1984, p. 269) 784
The above implies that our veridicality judgments play a key role in 785
determining whether or not information acts. For example, if I judge a shadow 786
in a dark night tomean “an assailant” and thus “danger,” this typically gives rise 787
to a powerful psychosomatic reaction; if I a little later notice that it was merely 788
a shadow of a branch (i.e., that the earlier judgment was incorrect), I will 789
typically calm down. We could expand the idea toward Plato by assuming that 790
our ethical judgments (e.g., “the choice of the best”) can typically also affect the 791
way information is activated, and consequently our behavior. The quantum 792
theoretical active information scheme enables such activity of information to 793
reach all the way to the level of fundamental physics, and in this way we can 794
begin, in a newway, tomake sense of a perennial puzzle inWestern philosophy, 795
namely the place and role of minds, meanings, and morals in the physical 796
world. 797
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